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What is ‘good governance’?
The idea of governance – as distinct from 
government – has become intellectually 
fashionable in academic circles over the 
past decade or so, constituting a new 
conceptual paradigm that embodies ideas 
about the dispersal and fragmentation of 
formerly centralised state authority, the 
increasing involvement of civil society in 
the delivery of public goods and services, 
and the networked collaboration of a 
wide range of governmental and non-
governmental bodies in the pursuit of 
public purposes and the public interest 
(for example, Bevir, 2009; Bovaird and 
Löffler, 2003; Kjaer, 2004; Osborne, 2010; 
Pierre and Peters, 2000, 2005; Rhodes, 
1996, 1997, 2007; Sörensen and Torfing, 
2007; Stivers, 2008). According to Rhodes 
(2007, p.1247), writing with particular 
reference to Britain, the model of 
Westminster hierarchical government is 
‘no longer acceptable’, requiring ‘a different 
story of the shift from Government with 
its narrative of the strong executive to 
governance through networks’. This 
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paradigm shift – which Marsh (2008, 
p.735) has critically described as ‘the new 
orthodoxy’ – has been strongly contested by 
other scholars who are also less convinced 
about the scope of actual change in 
governing relations (for example, Bell and 
Hindmoor, 2009; Frederickson, 2005; Hill 
and Lynn, 2005; Grix and Phillpots, 2011; 
Lynn, 2010, 2011; Olsen, 2006; Robichau, 
2011).  
While ‘government’ can be understood 
as an entity, embodying such components 
as the ‘machinery of government’, 
governance is better understood as a 
process. ‘Good governance’, therefore, 
refers to processes that work well or 
badly according to certain criteria. Just 
what these criteria are or should be is a 
matter of political choice. As Holmberg, 
Rothstein and Nasiritousi (2008) point 
out, ‘because “good governance” is such a 
broad concept and encompasses a range 
of issues, empirical analyses hinge on the 
definition of the term’. However, it must 
also be true that the assessments as to 
whether ‘governance’ is good or bad, or 
better or worse, must depend to some 
extent on the outcomes that they give 
rise to, support, facilitate or enhance. It 
is possible to conceive, theoretically at 
least, of a country which displays ‘good 
governance’ but repeatedly produces 
disastrous policy and governmental 
outcomes, and a situation in which the 
converse is true. (Even if such possibilities 
seem to offend common sense, this in itself 
is an insufficient reason for academics 
to desist from conceiving them.) Thus, 
there is an ongoing relationship between 
means and ends, process and result, 
and so on. And while this involves 
interaction between two clearly separable 
components at a conceptual level, in 
practice they are always in an iterative, 
mutually constitutive relationship. As 
Friedrich (1940, p.6) famously observed, 
‘Public policy is being formed as it is 
being executed, and it is likewise being 
executed as it is being formed.’   
‘Good governance’ is probably best 
defined experientially: for example, 
people living in what have come to be 
known as ‘failed states’ probably share a 
sense of living in a society that is chaotic, 
unpredictable and largely indifferent to 
their welfare, individually and collectively. 
Diamond (2007, p.119) does not paint a 
glittering picture: 
There is a specter haunting 
democracy in the world today. It 
is bad governance – governance 
that serves only the interests of 
a ruling elite. Governance that is 
drenched in corruption, patronage, 
favouritism, and abuse of power. 
Governance that is not responding 
to the massive and long-deferred 
social agenda of reducing inequality 
and unemployment and fighting 
against dehumanizing poverty. 
Governance that is not delivering 
broad improvements in people’s lives 
because it is stealing, squandering, or 
skewing the available resources. The 
Philippines, Bangladesh and Nigeria 
lie at different points along the 
path of democratic decay, but they 
reflect a common problem. Where 
power confers virtually unchecked 
opportunities for personal, factional, 
and party enrichment, it is difficult if 
not impossible to sustain democratic 
rules of the game. The democratic 
spirit of elections drowns in vote-
buying, rigging, violence, or all three.
Reversing, in summary form, 
Diamond’s dimensions of ‘bad 
governance’ it follows that its opposite – 
‘good governance’ – occurs in a democratic 
polity in which officialdom (political and 
administrative) serves the interests of all, 
is non-corrupt, is not given to the abuse 
of power, seeks effectively to reduce 
inequality, unemployment and poverty, 
uses public resources in the pursuit of 
collective purposes, operates according 
to the rule of law, and maintains fair and 
open electoral processes. 
We might assume that, if they were 
asked, most New Zealand citizens, for 
example, would say that they prefer to 
be subjected to ‘good governance’ than 
to ‘bad governance’, notwithstanding the 
likelihood that some people will see any 
form of government as ‘bad’. But ‘good 
governance’ and ‘bad governance’ are 
rhetorical categories rather than scientific 
ones. One person’s ‘good governance’ is 
another’s ‘bad governance’, in the same 
way that ‘One person’s “red tape” may be 
another’s treasured procedural safeguard’ 
(Kaufman, 1977, p.4).  
Such evaluations are obviously political 
rather than scientific. Citizens of virtually 
all of the world’s developed nations are 
likely to believe that their countries are 
more or less ‘well governed’, with their 
positive or negative judgements being 
based on a myriad of often conflicting 
assessments, impressions, experiences and 
biases. ‘Good governance’ is experienced 
by people in a wider community of shared 
interest, a polity – which may be another 
way of saying that ‘good governance’ is a 
process which effectively promotes and 
secures some albeit elusive notion of ‘the 
public interest’. As Rothstein (2013, p.12) 
says, ‘Trying to define good governance 
while ignoring the normative issue of 
what should constitute “good” defies 
logic.’ He cites Offe’s (2009) argument 
that the concept is empty of agency: 
‘There is no verb form of the word like 
there is for government. Members of the 
government can govern but what is it 
that members of a network of governance 
are doing? In reality, the concept tends 
to capture all forms of collective social 
co-ordination, outside pure market 
relations or the family’ (Rothstein, 2013, 
p.8). For his part, Offe (2009, p.553) 
claims that ‘the use value of the concept 
of governance for the social sciences 
is jeopardized by a tendency of “over 
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aggregating” the phenomena it refers to 
… It is not surprising that the concept 
has not been introduced by an authority 
in social theory, but by the World Bank, 
which suggested it in 1989 – with rapid 
and obviously lasting success.’
Nor, as Rothstein (2013) argues, 
should elements which need explanation, 
in and of themselves, be included in any 
definition of ‘good governance’, if the 
quality of how the state manages to govern 
society is considered to be a truer measure 
of ‘good governance’ than how access to 
power is organised in a representative 
democracy. In this regard, Rothstein cites 
Sen (2011), who claims that on most 
standard measures of human well-being, 
the People’s Republic of China now clearly 
outperforms democratically-governed 
India. For their part, Holmberg and 
Rothstein (2011) find weak, sometimes 
negative and sometimes no correlations 
between standard measures of human 
well-being (including child deprivation) 
and the level of representative democracy. 
They cite a study by Halleröd et al. 
(2013), using data from 68 low- and 
middle-income countries, measuring 
seven aspects of child poverty and 
showing no positive effect of democracy 
on levels of child deprivation for any of 
the indicators – access to safe water, food, 
sanitation, shelter, education, health care 
and information. Rothstein’s conclusion 
is that ‘Representative democracy is 
not a safe cure against severe poverty, 
child deprivation, economic inequality, 
illiteracy, being unhappy or not satisfied 
with one’s life, infant mortality, short 
life-expectancy, maternal mortality, 
access to safe water or sanitation, gender 
inequality, low school attendance for 
girls, low interpersonal trust or low trust 
in Parliament’ (Rothstein, 2013, p.4). 
Presumably, given the experiences of 
countries like Britain, the United States 
and New Zealand over the past couple of 
decades or so, he might have added high 
levels of income inequality to this list.    
Apart from the idea of governance 
that grew out of the critique in 
Western democracies of what has been 
seen as the growing inefficiency and 
rigidity of traditional Weberian public 
administration, Rothstein identifies 
two other emergent conceptualisations 
of governance. The first is the idea of 
‘participatory governance’, which focuses 
on means of overcoming a ‘democratic 
deficit’ by involving citizens in ‘broad 
based and open systems for collective 
deliberation in public decision making 
either as a complement or an alternative 
to the system of representative democracy’ 
(Rothstein, 2013, p.9). The second is what 
Rothstein calls the ‘political economy 
approach to governance’. This idea has 
not emerged from any dissatisfaction 
with public administration and policy in 
mature Western democracies, but from 
cross-national research on development 
and economic growth in so-called ‘third 
world’ countries. Here, ‘good governance’ 
– central to which is the effective fight 
against corruption – is seen to be 
essential in achieving social and economic 
development. 
The latter approach has been central 
to the work of international donor 
organisations, and is exemplified in the 
World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
developed in recent years under the 
imprimatur of the World Bank, covering 
more than 200 countries since 1996 and 
updated annually (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2008, 2010).1 The WGI are 
widely publicised and draw upon data 
from many sources in ranking countries 
on six aggregate measures of governance: 
voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption. The first two 
dimensions address the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored 
and replaced; the second and third ones 
are intended to cover the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the latter 
two deal with the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among 
them (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
2010, p.4). 
Because of the ambiguity of the 
idea of ‘governance’, and because 
complex definitions are too difficult to 
operationalise for comparative purposes, 
Rothstein (2013) prefers a parsimonious 
conceptualisation of the ‘quality of 
government’. This is built on the Rawlsian 
normative understanding of what should 
be seen as a just political order, and 
the Machiavellian strategy of practical 
implementation in enhancing human 
well-being, social trust, life satisfaction, 
peace and political legitimacy. Discarding 
the six dimensions of the WGI, Rothstein 
instead argues that the sine qua non of 
quality government is impartiality in the 
exercise of political power. Rothstein is 
aware of the objections that can be raised 
against such a parsimonious procedural 
conceptualisation.2 The main point is 
to contrast such a conceptualisation 
of ‘good government’, one that can 
be operationalised for meaningful 
comparative purposes, on the one hand, 
with the WGI attempt to operationalise 
for cross-country comparisons six 
dimensions of governance, all of which in 
themselves embody complex relationships 
between ‘input’ and ‘output’ sides of 
government. 
It may be, after all, that ‘good 
governance’ is something of an indefinable 
abstraction. Of course, in practical terms 
the notion speaks to a community’s 
One inevitable by-product of the 
emergence of such indexes has been a 
burgeoning of academic criticism of the 
methodologies adopted in formulating 
them.
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collective capacity to ensure that the 
haunting spectre of which Diamond 
speaks is not allowed to visit its calumnies 
on that particular polity. But which factors 
most enhance or diminish the risk of any 
of these tragic outcomes? What actions 
are necessary to ensure that any of these 
tragedies are avoided? What theoretical 
knowledge is available to inform such 
action, providing governors and people 
with some useful understanding of the 
relationships among a range of variables? 
These are challenging questions for public 
policy makers.
 Political considerations of what 
constitutes either ‘good government’ or 
‘good governance’ have been around a 
long time. Citizens in states the world 
over have always engaged in arguments 
about the quality of the regimes under 
which they live. And if, for the sake of 
argument, we can distinguish crudely 
between two groups – the governors and 
the governed – then the former have 
always tried to ensure the acquiescence of 
the latter, just as the latter have or have not 
been more or less compliant. The French 
patriots who sought the head of Louis 
XVI, Hitler’s Nazis who brought an end to 
the Weimar Republic, the revolutionaries 
who overthrew Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi, 
and so on, are all dramatic examples of 
the ‘conversation’ between the governors 
and the governed. They differ only in 
scope, intensity and consequences, rather 
than in kind, from the more mundane 
judgements made, for example, by voters 
in the regular electoral processes of stable 
liberal democracies.
What has emerged in recent years, 
however, and which by implication seeks 
to supplant political ways of judging 
governmental quality, is the attempt 
to generate comparative measures of 
‘good governance’, as if such quantitative 
evaluations can be based on detached, 
better informed, rational and scientific 
calculation, even assuming that we 
know what ‘good governance’ actually 
is. Apart from the WGI, there has been 
an explosion of indexes and indicators, 
as various international organisations 
develop measures to rank comparatively 
the performances of different countries, 
both globally and regionally. Among the 
most widely cited of other indexes to 
have emerged within the past 20 years, 
Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), established in 
1995, ranks countries according to the 
degree of corruption experienced across 
all areas of society. Others include the 
Asia Foundation’s Economic Governance 
Index, the OECD Better Life Index, 
the United Nations Development 
Programme’s Human Development 
Index, the Fund for Peace Failed States 
Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Democracy Index, the World Justice 
Project Rule of Law Index, the Open 
Budget Index, the Freedom House Index 
of Press Freedom, the UN Industrial 
Development Organisation’s Competitive 
Industrial Performance Index, and 
the Reporters Without Borders’ Press 
Freedom Index. Then there is Hofstede’s 
(2001) heroic attempt to rank countries 
on a set of six indexes which purport to 
measure, respectively, ‘power distance’ 
(PDI), ‘uncertainty avoidance’ (UAI), 
‘masculinity versus femininity’ (MAS), 
‘individualism versus collectivism’ (IDV), 
‘long-term versus short-term orientation’ 
(LTO) and ‘indulgence versus restraint’ 
(IVR). And so it goes on, seemingly 
without end. 
One inevitable by-product of the 
emergence of such indexes has been a 
burgeoning of academic criticism of the 
methodologies adopted in formulating 
them. While it is not the purpose of 
this article to canvass and try to assess 
the relative merits of all such criticisms, 
it is worthwhile mentioning some of 
those pertaining to the WGI, to at least 
gain a sense of how problematic are the 
foundations of such indexes in general. 
Criticisms of the WGI 
Indexes result from simplistic reductionism 
Probably the most common criticism of 
the WGI (and other indexes) is that the vast 
complexities of ‘good governance’ cannot 
be reduced to any meaningfully precise 
single index number. Arndt and Oman 
(2006, 2010) and Arndt (2008), perhaps 
the most widely cited critics of the WGI, 
emphasise this point in their critiques. 
While a single composite number is 
seductive, and enables quick comparisons 
to be made among countries, the problem 
is that for comparative purposes these 
numbers are virtually meaningless, since 
they are based on sources and information 
which vary greatly between countries, 
and even within countries, over time 
(Anderson, 2009). As Pollitt (2008, p.19) 
argues, the concept of ‘governance’ itself is 
‘so vague, abstract, value-laden and multi-
faceted as to present an insurmountable 
challenge for expert measurers and lay 
decision makers alike … the idea of 
reducing governance to six composite 
indicators – let alone one, as some indices 
attempt – seems just too Olympian’.
Indexes are ideological and ahistorical
The WGI emerged out of, and were 
intricately connected to, the neo-liberal 
ideas which constituted the so-called 
‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1980s. 
This sought to progressively replace 
‘Weberian’ public administration 
with market-driven modes of policy 
formulation and service delivery. It also, 
however, sought to ‘roll back the state’, by 
means of economic deregulation, cutting 
back public expenditure, guaranteeing 
individual property rights against 
collective predation, and privatising 
state assets. In this view, diminished 
governance is good governance, and the 
Probably the most common criticism of 
the World Governance Indicators is that 
the vast complexities of ‘good governance’ 
cannot be reduced to any meaningfully 
precise single index number.
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‘sound policies’ of which Kaufmann and 
his collaborators speak are assumedly 
those policies which serve such ends, 
as distinct from those that might serve 
other – perhaps more social democratic? 
– ones. It may not be necessary to agree 
fully with Pollitt’s trenchant assessment 
in taking his point: the operationalisation 
of the elusive concept of ‘governance’ has 
been taken over by ‘a group of technocrats 
employed at an intergovernmental, non-
majoritarian institution which is both 
well-heeled in resource terms and well-
insulated against conventional political 
questioning’ (Pollitt, 2008, p.20).  
The WGI are based on a strong 
ideological orientation towards the 
amorphous notion of ‘good governance’, 
interpreting it as a product of ‘less 
government’, with a strong ‘minimalist’ 
bias in operating assumptions about 
the legitimate scope of state power and 
authority. In Offe’s words (2009, p.555), 
‘governance’ ‘is not interested in enhancing 
state capacity, but in substituting or at 
least restraining it according to neo-
liberal premises’. According to Oman 
and Arndt (2010), bias in the WGI stems 
from the imbalance between the weight 
given to household surveys and similar 
instruments, and that given to the opinion 
of firm surveys and expert assessments. 
The indicators are also ahistorical, 
in that they tend to represent their 
key dimensions as central to a liberal 
democratic ‘end of history’ apotheosis. 
They say almost nothing about the 
complex historical, cultural and political 
forces which have shaped the present 
day representation of a state in the form 
of a series of index numbers. They say 
nothing, therefore, about how those 
historical factors can shape the future of 
governance in those states.
They are tautological, lacking in 
transparency, and non-theoretical 
Langbein and Knack (2008) argue that the 
six dimensions of the WGI do not in fact 
measure different things, but rather that 
each of the indexes reflects the perceptions 
of the quality of governance more broadly. 
Similarly, the ambiguity of the idea of 
‘good governance’ gives rise to tautology: 
as Rothstein and Teorell (2008, p.168) put 
it, ‘What is required for the quality of life 
enjoyed by citizens? Quality of governance. 
What is quality of governance? That which 
promotes the quality of life’. This in itself 
assumes that ‘good governance’ is in fact 
that which enhances citizens’ quality of 
life, which is what Rothstein and Teorell 
themselves quite reasonably argue. But if 
quality of governance is considered to be 
that which enhances economic production 
and commercial profitability, then, as 
the Economist (4 June 2005) critically 
observed, ‘What is required for growth. 
Good governance. And what counts as 
good governance? That which promotes 
growth. And what is required for growth 
…’. Rothstein and Teorell’s argument 
(p.168) that Kaufmann et al.’s conception 
of ‘good governance’ is ‘just about as 
broad as any definition of “politics”’ is 
hard to resist. 
Do the six WGI dimensions simply 
say roughly the same thing, but with 
different words in each case? If there is 
indeed some substantive relationship 
between economic development and 
‘good governance’, then is it a causal one 
– and if so, in what direction? – or is it 
a spurious correlation more explicable 
by other, independent variables? For 
example, do low levels of governmental 
and/or business corruption foster good 
governance, or does good governance 
keep the lid on governmental and/or 
business corruption? Is it possible to have 
simultaneously both good governance 
and high levels of corruption, and low 
levels of corruption together with not-
so-good or bad governance? These are 
theoretical possibilities at least, but the 
WGI do not recognise them as such, since 
low corruption is taken a priori to be one 
of the six dimensions of good governance. 
The situation is clouded by the fact that 
low and high corruption, on the one 
hand, and good or bad governance on the 
other are relative not absolute concepts. 
Countries like the United States, Britain 
and Australia, for example, score 
relatively well on both good governance 
indicators and on the CPI, but not as well 
as a number of other countries, including 
New Zealand, on either indexes. It is 
not at all clear how the WGI can help to 
explain, as distinct from demonstrating, 
such differences (Andrews, 2008). 
As Oman and Arndt (2010) see it, the 
WGI suffer from a transparency paradox, 
in that, while the construction of the 
indexes is itself not transparent, they 
are nevertheless used by international 
aid agencies as a means of enhancing 
the transparency and objectivity of their 
aid allocation decisions. The lack of 
transparency results in the main from 
the absence of any coherent theory or 
analytical framework of governance to 
guide their scoring systems. They simply 
produce scores according to aggregated 
subjective perceptions relating to each 
indicator. They do not say anything 
explicitly about the priorities that 
governments might be encouraged to 
attend to, or the sequencing of reforms 
and developments that might arguably be 
needed to lift a country’s WGI scores. Are 
there social, political or economic ‘tipping 
points’, for example, which can have a 
major impact, for better or for worse 
(depending on the specific criteria by 
which ‘better’ and ‘worse’ are evaluated)?  
Not only do the WGI tend to oversimplify 
complex realities, but the indexes 
themselves tend to become reified: that 
is, they become accepted as precise 
and objective measurements, as largely 
indisputable ‘facts’.
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Misuse
Not only do the WGI tend to oversim-
plify complex realities, but the indexes 
themselves tend to become reified: that 
is, they become accepted as precise and 
objective measurements, as largely indis-
putable ‘facts’.3 They therefore diminish 
rather than enhance the capacity for more 
insightful analysis and judgements about 
the countries themselves. Because they 
lack any coherent theoretical foundations, 
they say nothing about how individual 
countries can develop better governance 
(assuming that it is possible to know in 
what specific ways ‘better’ governance 
differs from ‘good governance’, or ‘not so 
good governance’). 
Worse than this, however, to the extent 
that the WGI (and the CPI) become 
used as decision tools for international 
agencies, the WGI can actually impede 
what might be considered by many to 
be desirable forms of development, 
simply because the indicators do not 
necessarily provide valid and meaningful 
comparisons among different countries.
The problem lies with composite 
indexes, like the WGI, rather than with 
indexes per se. Pollitt (2008, p.18) argues 
that ‘WGIs … are highly attractive to elite 
groups yet almost useless, if not actively 
misleading, for lay decisionmakers … By 
contrast PISA [the OECD’s Programme 
for International Student Assessment] 
measures are attractive and useful, 
though with some significant pitfalls 
concerning what the tests do and do 
not mean, and with a considerable gap 
between the results and the drawing of 
policy conclusions.’ 
In other words, indexes are useful and 
valid to the extent that they measure what 
can sensibly and reasonably accurately 
be measured, rather than trying or 
purporting to measure accurately what 
they cannot so measure. In this regard, 
the Serendipity Prayer may be recast: 
‘Grant me the ability to measure those 
things than can sensibly be measured; 
the intelligence to understand those that 
cannot be measured; and the wisdom to 
know the difference.’
The timeless fallacy of the ‘one best way’
The issue of the lack of a theoretical 
model or conceptual framework to 
explain what ‘good governance’ actually is 
and how it might be achieved undermines 
the implicit assumption that there is any 
single pathway to ‘good governance’ (or 
it defines ‘good governance’ in such a way 
that it is a function of a particular set of 
elements and factors – the tautological 
problem again). As discussed, the WGI, 
developed under the auspices of the World 
Bank, suggest that ‘good governance’ is 
essential to socio-economic development. 
Indeed, international donor organisations 
stress the need for the development of 
sound political institutions, together with 
effective anti-corruption strategies, to be 
key components in their decisions on the 
allocation of aid. 
However, there has emerged a 
growing scepticism about these sorts of 
assumptions, one which rejects the idea 
that ‘one size fits all’ when it comes to 
development, and is much more open-
minded about the relationships between 
such factors as economic development 
and the progressive establishment of 
the institutions believed to be central to 
‘good governance’. For example, in his 
comparative study of public financial 
management in a selection of OECD and 
non-OECD countries Andrews (2010) 
found that there was no single best way, 
no best practice model, in achieving 
sustained sound practice and that good 
public financial management means 
different things in different countries. 
In similar vein, Sundaram and 
Chowdhury, in their edited volume 
entitled Is Good Governance Good for 
Development? (2012), strongly question 
any received wisdom that economic 
development is dependent upon action 
that would substantially raise countries’ 
scores on the six WGI dimensions. The 
rapid rates of economic development 
displayed over the past two or three 
decades by countries like China and 
Vietnam are obvious cases in point. In 
Vietnam the regime has deliberately 
eschewed the progressive development 
of Western institutions like ‘the rule of 
law’, in the apparent belief that economic 
growth is the main priority and any real 
concern over ‘good governance’ – if it is 
a concern at all – can be left until later 
(Painter, 2012). (The same can also be 
said of China, of course.) Painter (2006) 
has mounted a similar argument in regard 
to Vietnam’s apparent adoption of some 
of the principles of Western New Public 
Management (NPM) before securing 
the rule of law and an administrative 
system based solidly on the principles of 
Weberian legal-rational authority. He is 
not convinced that some of the key ideas 
embodied in NPM cannot be successfully 
adopted in developing countries where 
legal-rational foundations have not been 
consolidated – a view that runs counter 
to the widely cited argument made by 
Schick (1998). 
That there are indeed many different 
ways to achieve economic development, 
rather than a single technocratic template 
based on the sort of dimensions embodied 
in the WGI, is reflected in the pragmatic 
programmes of marketisation displayed 
in post-Mao China, according to the 
idea of ‘crossing the river by feeling the 
stones’ (Gabriel, 1998). More generally, 
Grindle (2004, pp.541-2) argues that the 
path to ‘good governance’ as a means of 
 
... there was no single best way, no best 
practice model, in achieving sustained 
sound practice and that good public 
financial management means different 
things in different countries. 
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effectively tackling poverty in developing 
countries is ‘fraught with ambiguities, 
challenges, and the potential for failure 
and less-than-anticipated results’. She 
suggests that the best that can be hoped 
for, at least in the shorter term, is ‘good 
enough governance’.  
Response
The authors of the WGIs have offered 
detailed and sometimes quite persuasive 
refutations of these and other criticisms 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007, 
2010). In response to Thomas (2010), who 
queries what the WGI actually measure, 
they argue that the absence of definitional 
consensus regarding governance ‘would 
paralyze any effort to measure governance 
using any means’ (2007, p.24).4 Similarly, 
‘Endlessly waiting for the articulation 
of a complete, coherent and consistent 
theory of governance before proceeding 
to measurement and action (of course 
with due regard to limitations), while 
perhaps intellectually satisfying to a 
few, would be impractical to the point 
of irresponsibility’ (ibid., p.26). They 
are particularly careful to offer caveats 
regarding the interpretation and use of 
the WGI, cautioning users that ‘aggregate 
indicators such as the six WGI measures 
are often a blunt tool for policy advice at 
the country level’, and that ‘Users … can 
usefully complement their analysis with 
an in-depth examination of the detailed 
disaggregated data sources underlying the 
WGI, together with a wealth of possible 
[sic] more detailed and nuanced sources 
of country-level data and diagnostics on 
governance issues’ (2010, p.21). 
Regarding ideological biases, they 
point out that they found no substantial 
difference between the views offered by 
business people and those household 
surveys that they did use, nor any 
apparent bias in the ways rating agencies 
assessed the performances of governments 
of the political left or right. At least in 
regard to perceptions of corruption, this 
argument may be supported by Rothstein 
(2013, p.22-3), who cites a large survey of 
‘ordinary people’ in various EU countries 
which produced results ‘surprisingly 
similar’ to expert-based measures (see 
Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein, 2013). 
However, much of their response 
focuses on narrower methodological 
points, without really offering a 
convincing refutation of the argument 
that (a) ‘governance’ is too elusive 
a concept in the first place to be 
operationalised with the precision that 
the WGI purport to offer; and (b) their 
own assumptions as to what constitutes 
‘good governance’ demand critical 
scrutiny. Moreover, their pleas for caution 
in the interpretation and use of the WGI 
– ‘our estimation of, and emphasis on … 
margins of error is intended to enable 
users to make more sophisticated use 
of imperfect information’ – while valid 
in itself, overlooks the reality that most 
(especially non-academic) users of the 
WGI are likely to have neither the time, 
expertise nor inclination to act on such 
warnings. As Pollitt (2008, p.20) asks, 
‘what percentage of the users of WGIs 
access the technical documentation [that 
supports them]?’
Social science and social criticism: keeping 
a balance
Tsoukas’s (1997) notion of the ‘tyranny 
of light’ gives pause for thought. In his 
words: 
Since the Enlightenment, knowledge 
has been viewed through the 
metaphor of light. More knowledge 
has been taken to mean a stronger 
human ability to see and thus an 
enhanced capability for action or, to 
be precise, for control … That more 
knowledge could cause problems, 
that light might prove another 
tyranny, that knowledge might bring 
suffering, were not thoughts the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment 
were prepared to entertain. (Tsoukas, 
1997, p.838) 
Tsoukas identifies three paradoxes of 
the modern age: there is more information, 
but less understanding; more information 
but less trust; and more social engineering 
and more problems.5 Such contradictions 
suggest that a type of Gresham’s Law in 
economics (that is, bad money drives out 
good money) applies to the extent that, 
in the comparative assessment of ‘good 
governance’, quantitative data tends to 
drive out qualitative assessment, a process 
hugely enhanced by the increasing 
sophistication and capacity of information 
technology. Experimental knowledge 
derived from spurious calculation that is 
overly abstracted from lived realities can 
tend to supplant insightful reflection on 
social and political experience.6 
A good example is provided by Gerring 
and Thacker (2004). Their data enables 
them to calculate precisely that a country 
which swaps its federal, presidential 
system for a unitary, parliamentary one 
can reduce its level of perceived political 
corruption ‘by somewhere between 0.335 
to 0.860, or by 0.586 on average’ (Gerring 
and Thacker, 2004, p.326). Admittedly, 
they qualify their calculation with ‘ceteris 
paribus’, but of course when it comes to 
such a radical transformation of a political 
system all other things are most unlikely 
to be equal or to remain the same. While 
they themselves are not unmindful of 
this, the prospect of serious obstacles to 
such a change does not deter them: 
as a practical matter, the alteration 
of basic-level political institutions 
lies more directly in the control of 
governments than other factors that 
might ameliorate political corruption. 
According to the WGI [New Zealand] is 
one of the best governed countries, with 
very little corruption – and it is a unitary 
and parliamentary system to boot. 
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It is usually easier to change political 
institutions than to achieve long-
term economic growth, and it is of 
course impossible to change cultural 
and historical antecedents such as 
religion (the presence or absence of 
Protestantism), legal origin (English 
or non-English), socialism or the 
tenure of democracy. Whatever its 
obstacles, constitutional reform may 
offer a relatively practical programme 
for the improvement of governance 
around the world. (ibid., p.327)
Again New Zealand could find itself 
touted as a model for reform, just as it 
was during the heyday of NPM in the late 
1980s and early 90s. According to the WGI 
it is one of the best governed countries, 
with very little corruption – and it is a 
unitary and parliamentary system to boot. 
However, lest New Zealand should once 
again become the destination for hordes of 
academics, politicians and governmental 
officials from other countries, hell bent 
on discovering the Holy Grail of ‘good 
governance’, they might first pause to 
ask what New Zealand’s scores on the 
WGI between 1995 and 2011 – see Figure 
1 – actually mean, in their own terms 
as distinct from comparing them with 
those of other countries. (And for their 
part, New Zealanders might ponder this 
article’s epigraph, from Lipson.)  
Are they not largely meaningless? Or 
worse, are they not misleading? The scores 
indicate that things have not changed 
much over the best part of two decades, 
except – paradoxically – for ‘Political 
Stability/No Violence’, which seems to 
have suddenly spiked around 2004, before 
dropping below ‘normal’ levels around 
2008–09. How can one sensibly explain 
these numerical changes? Does the drop 
around 2004 represent the widespread 
protest movement against the proposed 
foreshore and seabed legislation? Was this 
movement a manifestation of increased 
political instability and violence, or do 
both the spike and the drop reflect the 
political predispositions of those whose 
opinions shaped the scores? It would not 
be difficult to mount an argument to that 
effect, but no doubt other arguments 
could readily be made in refutation. 
Similar ambiguity surrounds the 
scores for the other five dimensions. 
What does the graph tell us about the 
ongoing effects of the welfare reforms of 
1990–93, described as ‘the most radical 
social policy changes in 60 years’ (Boston, 
1999, p.4)? Probably nothing. In short, 
anyone looking at this graph for valid 
information about changes over time 
within New Zealand society and politics 
would probably be left imposing meaning 
on the graph rather than inferring 
meaning from it. 
This is not just a problem of social 
inquiry, whether formally scientific or 
socially critical, per se, but is also, and 
paradoxically, an incipient threat to the 
democratic values which are supposed 
to be central to at least a Western notion 
of ‘good governance’. It can be argued 
that indexes such as the WGI make it 
easier rather than harder for lay people to 
consider ‘good governance’ because they 
have available to them a neat figure and 
a set of rankings that they can readily 
understand, useful reference points to 
guide their own assessments. This may be 
so, but the question arises as to whether 
it is not in fact better to have no such 
indexes if such numbers disguise a whole 
host of methodological problems which 
by their nature tend to undermine the 
validity of the index itself; and secondly, 
whether the existence of what can easily 
become a reified index actually tends 
to disenfranchise lay people from what 
should be a much more inclusive debate. 
Most people do not display the mentality 
of Charles Dickens’ typically Victorian 
schoolmaster in Hard Times, Thomas 
Gradgrind: ‘A man of realities. A man 
of facts and calculations’ (Dickens, 1961, 
p.2).7 
Today, in the era of what Pollitt (2008, 
p.18) calls ‘the politics of quantification’, 
numbers embody in themselves a claim 
to ‘science’ and ‘objectivity’, purporting 
to place them above political disputation. 
In this sense, the ‘facts’ always speak for 
themselves, a position not dissimilar to 
the argument invoked in New Zealand 
and elsewhere during the neo-liberal 
heyday that ‘there is no alternative’. 
Tsoukas argues, in ways that are also 
analogous to the New Zealand experience 
of those times, that this claim to higher 
levels of scientific sophistication tends to 
alienate lay audiences, who see instead 
the machinations of a technological elite 
like the World Bank. 
Paradoxically, however, there may 
be something of an inverse relationship 
between the artifactual nature of indexes 
such as the WGI, on the one hand, and 
their political force on the other. This is 
Source: Zirker, Scrimgeour and Gregory (2013)
Figure 1:  New Zealand on WGI, 1995 – 2011. From Zirker, 
 Scrimgeour and Gregory (2013).
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because, although these measures may 
often be treated with suspicion by lay 
people, lay people also – in the absence 
of anything better – will tend to accept 
them as unproblematic measures, if 
indeed lay people take more than a 
cursory interest in them at all. On the 
other hand, however, such indexes tend 
to become the lingua franca within elite 
discourse. They thus have a major impact, 
tending to become reified constructions 
which constitute a shorthand means 
of representing, if not understanding, 
what otherwise have to be seen as highly 
complex and contingent phenomena. 
They increasingly take on a life of their 
own as valid depictions of the ‘real 
world’. Tools for research can too readily 
become masters of understanding. This 
can diminish thoughtful communication 
not only within elites, but also among 
lay people, and between elites and lay 
people. 
What is more desirable in attempts 
to understand what constitutes ‘good 
governance’ – largely spurious objectivity 
or inevitably manifest subjectivity? And 
is it better to try to be roughly right than 
to strive to be precisely wrong? While 
formal social science, as exemplified in 
the burgeoning of numerical indicators, 
can usefully contribute to public debates 
on the extent to which any country 
displays ‘good governance’, it should not 
be allowed to displace such debate. As 
Bevir (2006, p.601) puts it, a challenge is 
how ‘effectively to engage social scientists, 
most of whom still favour typologies, 
correlations and models, rather than 
skeptical narratives. Many social scientists 
are aware that their modes of knowledge 
create distortions and simplifications. 
They just regard these problems as 
necessary consequences of crafting 
generalizations that are capable of guiding 
action in the world.’ Social science should 
be mediated by such open and usually 
informal inquiry and commentary as 
diagrammatically represented in Figure 2, 
where the shaping of a better informed 
understanding of what shapes and 
maintains ‘good governance’ emerges 
around the nexus point of an ongoing, 
mutually constitutive relationship. 
The irony is that seeking after a 
scientific measure of ‘good governance’ 
(including levels of corruption), tends in 
itself to diminish the democratic essence 
which is so often thought to be central to 
‘good government’. Democratic virtue is 
thereby thrice reduced, in the hubristic 
pursuit of a scientific objectivity which by 
its flawed nature can only be spurious at 
best and politically self-serving at worst. 
Valid cross-national comparisons of 
factors in different countries which can be 
argued to diminish or enhance the quality 
of both government and governance are 
instead increasingly displaced by reified 
illusions. 
Conclusion
Indexes and indicators such as those 
embodied in the WGI have a valid role 
to play in social science research into the 
means of promoting, establishing and 
sustaining government or governance 
which is ‘getting better’, ‘good’ or even 
‘outstanding’, depending on the criteria 
by which such categorisations are made. 
Those who generate these measurements, 
as upholders of Tsoukas’s ‘tyranny of 
light’, are not about to turn their ivory 
towers into tents and steal quietly into 
the dark night. However, in promoting 
the sharp illumination that they believe 
measurement provides they should not 
at the same time be allowed to extinguish 
the more diffuse, yet more authentic, 
glow of understanding that is emitted 
by democratic discourse on what these 
criteria should be in the first place. 
All public institutions – including the 
Institute of Governance and Policy Studies 
– and all components of civil society have 
to be committed to fostering, developing 
and sustaining an intelligent and balanced 
relationship between social science and 
social criticism. In the quest for ‘good 
governance’ the real challenge is to ensure 
that while we have ever burgeoning stores 
of data and information, we also have 
more knowledge of what this data and 
information actually means, and – above 
all else – more wisdom in applying it.  
1 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
2 For example, a procedural definition of political processes 
cannot preclude morally bad decisions which might violate 
the rights of minorities and individuals. Rothstein argues 
that ‘the strategy suggested by John Rawls is the right one. 
His central idea is that if a society structures its systems for 
making and enforcing collective decisions in a fair way, this 
will increase the likelihood that the outcomes are normatively 
just’ (Rothstein, 2013, p.115).
3 See Oman and Arndt (2010, pp.15-16) for a critique of the 
over-estimation of the accuracy of countries’ point scores for 
cross-country comparisons and the identification of change 
(or the lack of it) in the quality of governance over time.
4 They were responding to an earlier (2006) draft of Thomas 
(2010).
5 This is reminiscent of T.S. Eliot: ’Where is the wisdom we 
have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have 
lost in information?’ 
6 As Bevir (2006, p.592) argues: ‘If natural scientists and 
economists played the fullest role in directing the expansion 
of state activity after the Second World War, other social 
scientists also contributed, and a positivist concept of social 
science helped to legitimate their contributions at a time 
of optimism about technocratic reform. With state funding 
for social science favouring scientism and policy relevance, 
social scientists who defined themselves as delivering such 
goods were simply more likely to find stable employment. 
The positivist concept of science also appealed to some 
social scientists as a way of taking control of the mass 
of data then being generated. The new techniques and 
concerns of modernist empiricism had led, in this view, to 
“hyper-factualism”; social scientists were being overwhelmed 
by quantitative and qualitative data in the absence of a 
theoretical framework with which to make sense of it all’.
7 ‘A man who proceeds upon the principle that two and two 
are four, and nothing over, and who is not to be talked into 
allowing for anything over … With a rule and a pair of scales, 
and the multiplication table always in his pocket, Sir, ready 
to weigh and measure any parcel of human nature, and tell 
you exactly what it comes to. It is a mere question of figures, 
a case of simple arithmetic’ (Dickens, 1961, p.2). 
Note: This is a short version of a working 
paper, ‘Assessing “good governance” and 
corruption in New Zealand: “scientific” 
measurement, political discourse, and 
historical narrative’, published on the 
IGPS website: http://igps.victoria.ac.nz/
publications/publications/show/347
Figure 2: The crucial nexus 
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